We can express these norms of practical rationality roughly as follows:
Intention Consistency: The following is always pro tanto irrational: intending A and intending B, while believing that A and B are not copossible.
Means-End Coherence:
The following is always pro tanto irrational: intending E while believing that a necessary means to E is M and that M requires that one now intend M, and yet not now intending M.
7
Such norms figure in our interpretative practices and in our assessments of agents. 8 But my focus here is on their role in a planning agent's firstpersonal practical reasoning. According to the planning theory, the (perhaps, implicit) acceptance of these norms is operative in such reasoning. Given prior but partial plans of action, threats of means-end incoherence pose deliberative problems. Given demands for intention consistency, prior intentions provide a filter on options to be considered in deliberation. In these ways guidance by our (implicit) acceptance of these norms is central to the proper functioning of planning in our agency.
Turn now to the idea of a reason-that is, a normative reasonfor action. We can begin with T. M. Scanlon's remark that "a reason for something . . . [is] a consideration that counts in favor of it."
9 Once we try to go beyond this remark, however, controversy looms.
Begin with two fundamental ideas. The first is that a normative reason for action must be able to connect up with motivation of action. Bernard Williams puts it this way: "if it is true that A has a reason to J, then it must be possible that he should J for that reason." And this leads Williams to the claim that "A has a reason to J only if he could 7. Why 'pro tanto'? Well, there can be practical analogues of the paradox of the preface. There can be cases of rational triage in which, given limits of time and attention, one must focus on some proper subset of threatened violations. And there can be cases of psychological compulsion in which the response that is on balance rational involves a limited violation of one of these norms. (I return to this last sort of case in my discussion below of views of Kieran Setiya.) In cases such as these, we may sometimes want to say that good practical reasoning leads the agent to a psychological profile that involves a pro tanto (not merely prima facie) irrationality. So we need to allow that to be guided solely and exclusively by a single such rationality requirement can sometimes be a failure in one's practical thinking. (I discuss this last point in my "Setiya on Intention, Rationality, and Reasons," in Analysis Reviews, ed. Anthony Ellis [Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming].) 8. The point about interpretation is familiar from work of Donald Davidson. I discuss the assessment of agents in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, chaps. 4-6. 9. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 17.
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reach the conclusion to J by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has."
10
The second idea is that to judge that something is a reason for action is appropriately to endorse it. One version of this idea, for example, is at the heart of Allan Gibbard's expressivist metanormative theory.
11
A full theory of the nature of normative reasons for action, if we could have one, would need to do justice to both of these ideas, although perhaps not in the shape they are given by Williams and Gibbard. 12 Perhaps in the end, in the effort to do justice to both of these ideas, the very idea of a normative reason for action will fall apart under our philosophical microscopes. But here I proceed on the optimistic assumptions both that there is an important and coherent idea of a normative reason for action that lies behind current debates and that both Williams and Gibbard are pointing to important aspects of that idea. 13 My concern is with the question of how some such idea of a normative reason for action-assuming both its coherence and its importance for practical philosophy-needs to be connected to the idea of practical rationality. As the discussion develops, I will make some comments about 'internal reasons'-normative reasons grounded in what Williams calls the agent's "subjective motivational set."
14 And I will take it for granted 10 . Bernard Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in his Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35-45, 39, and 35.
11. Gibbard aims to "pursue the element of endorsement that full-information accounts leave out." This leads him to the claim that "when a person calls something-call it R-a reason for doing X, he expresses his acceptance of norms that say to treat R as weighing in favor of doing X" (Allan Gibbard 14. However, I leave it open whether we need, in all cases of normative reasons for action, an essential relativity to the agent's actual 'motivational set' of the sort that Williams sees as a necessary condition for being a reason for action. See Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-13, and "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame." (For Williams's focus specifically on necessary conditions for a reason for action, see 35 of the latter.) For a development of Williams's concerns that tries to avoid this kind of relativity, see Smith, "Internal Reasons." that to judge that something is a reason for action is, at least in part, to endorse its role of having justifying weight in relevant practical deliberation. I will, however, leave open the question of exactly how to interpret this endorsement. And I will leave open exactly how to put together these two aspects of the idea of a reason for action. My hope is to articulate interrelations between rationality and reasons that will be a part of any fully developed theory.
We can now ask: Do intentions generally provide normative reasons for means? This is not the question: Do states in the agent's subjective motivational set ever ground internal reasons for action? As I see it, certain kinds of agential commitments and concerns can ground internal reasons for action, although a judgment in a particular case that there is such a reason needs to be defended in normative reflection.
15
My question here, however, differs from this general question in two ways. The first is that my question specifically concerns intention, not the agent's subjective motivational set quite generally. To explain the second difference, I need to make a distinction. One way an intention might provide a reason for means is by being a ground of a corresponding internal reason. But an intention might provide a reason for action without itself being such a ground. This would happen if there is in the background a practical reason which together with the intention induces a reason for action that is not induced by that background reason by itself. And my current question concerns this broader idea of providing a reason for action.
That said, I think that intending E does not in general provide a reason for (intending) means to E. 16 My reason for saying this appeals to the possibility of certain kinds of failures in intending E.
Suppose, that my decision in favor of end E is irrationally akratic: my stable best judgment about the balance of reasons favors an alternative end F over E. If my intention in favor of E were in general to provide a further reason for means to E, then such a reason would favor the means to E even when my intention in favor of E is akratic. Such a reason might then tilt the balance of reasons in favor of the means to E over the means to F. This would be an odd kind of bootstrapping of the case in favor of the means to E over the case in favor of the means to F. After all, from my own point of view the intention in favor 15. The relevant norms might include the idea that the commitments and concerns that ground such internal reasons do not favor things that are unqualifiedly bad. 16. In putting the idea this way, I am supposing that all reasons for intending the means are reasons for the means. In this way I am putting to one side the issue raised by Gregory Kavka in "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis 43 (1983): 33-36. Now suppose, in a second case, that the end is a very bad endethnic cleansing, say-and yet the agent wholeheartedly intends that end. This intention may well motivate the performance of terrible means. Should we also say that in such a case one's intending that end provides a normative reason for those means? Well, recall that in seeing something as a normative reason one endorses its role of having justifying weight in relevant practical deliberation. So long as we retain this idea, I think that we will, in the absence of some special consideration, want to resist the claim that this intention in favor of ethnic cleansing provides a reason in favor of the terrible means.
18
So I think we should deny that an intention in favor of an end quite generally provides a normative reason for the means. So-limiting our attention to necessary means-we are led to Intentions # Reasons: Intending E does not in general provide a practical, normative reason for necessary means to E and so does not in general provide a practical, normative reason for intending those necessary means.
19
Intentions # Reasons does not say that intentions never provide reasons for necessary means. 20 But it does say that intentions do not always do this.
17. This kind of example was a main concern of mine in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, 24-27. See also my "Intention and Means-End Reasoning."
18. For an expressivist version of this thought, see Allan Gibbard's remarks about Caligula in "Morality as Consistency in Living," Ethics 110 (1999): 140-64, 145. The reason for my qualification-"in the absence of some special consideration"-will become clear below.
19. The intended interpretation of Intentions # Reasons is that it entails that intending E does not in general provide a reason for intending necessary means to E even when the agent has the relevant beliefs about means.
20. Indeed, I take it that certain kinds of non-akratic intended projects that do not aim at unqualifiedly bad ends do normally ground internal reasons for action. When, e.g., the boy in Sartre's famous case settles on a project of fighting for the Free French, he may thereby come to have normative reasons for certain actions that he did not have before. And when I settle on an academic career rather than a career in business, I may thereby come to have reasons for action that I did not have before. ( I think that John Broome and Joseph Raz are sometimes understood as holding the view that intentions never provide reasons for means. Broome writes that "it is not credible that, just by adopting some end, you make it the case that you have reason to pursue it" Consider now the relation between such reasons and rationality. If you intend E but do not now intend known necessary means intending which you know is now necessary, then it follows from Means-End Coherence that you are pro tanto irrational. This follows even if your intention is akratic, or favors a bad end. But we are also saying that it is not in general true that the intention in favor of E provides a corresponding reason for the means. What then is the precise normative significance of norms of practical rationality like Means-End Coherence?
II. NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTENTION COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY
Suppose you are a planning agent and you settle on an intention in favor of E. Since you are a planning agent, your further practical thinking will be guided by your (at least, implicit) acceptance of norms of means-end coherence and intention consistency. This is normal, rational functioning of a planning agent. Still, we can ask: What can you say to justify this, to explain why it matters that you be guided in this way? 21 Well, the first thing you can say is that in being guided by (your acceptance of) a norm of means-end coherence, you are more likely to pursue E effectively. After all, you are not a god who can simply will "Let there be E!" and expect the world to cooperate. You can also say that guidance by a norm of intention consistency makes it more likely that you will not trip over yourself. You can, then, say that guidance by these norms is likely useful in the particular case.
You can also note that the general mode of thinking involved in planning agency that is guided by these norms has much to be said for it. You can note that violations of norms of consistency and coherence will normally undermine effective agency and associated forms of coordination. In this sense, you can say, these planning capacities-where these include guidance by these norms-are universal means. 22 Further, you can say that the cross-temporal self-government that you value highly involves forms of cross-temporal organization of thought and action that ( 
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are, for us, to a large extent attributable to these planning capacities.
23
And, finally, you can note that forms of sociality that you value highly involve structures of planning agency. 24 You can in this way cite a trio of interrelated ways in which structures of planning-where these include guidance by the cited norms-contribute quite generally to the richness of life and the effectiveness of agency.
25
So there is a lot you can say to justify the way in which you are guided by these norms. But there is one thing you cannot yet say. In being guided by these norms, it may well seem to you that you are according intention coherence and consistency their own noninstrumental normative significance in the particular case, a significance that is distinctive in the sense that it is not merely a matter of the promotion of your particular intended ends. But, so far, this has not been justified. Granted, your first thought is about your particular case. But it sees consistency and coherence as tools for effectively pursuing your intended ends, tools whose normative significance derives instrumentally from whatever normative significance those ends have. And your second-three-part-thought concerns the benefits of a general mode of thinking, not specifically the benefits in the particular case. And one lesson from debates about rule consequentialism is that the step from justifying a general practice to justifying a specific instance of that practice is fraught and prone to worries about "rule worship."
You would be in good company, for this is a view to which both Joseph Raz and Niko Kolodny have been led. 27 As they see it, what matters for deliberation are the specific reasons for the specific actions at issue. Coherence and consistency of intention can help us respond to those specific reasons. But it is a myth to think of coherence and consistency as themselves having a distinctive, noninstrumental normative significance in the particular case.
I myself do not think this idea is a myth. I do think that the grounds that support the role of our acceptance of these norms in our practical thinking go beyond-in ways just indicated-such a distinctive, noninstrumental normative significance. Nevertheless, I believe that there is, at least normally, some such distinctive, normative significance and that its recognition contributes to our understanding of our agency. To defend this, however, I need to solve a hard problem.
28

III. THE PROBLEM
To reject a myth theory, we need an explanation of the purported distinctive normative force of these rationality norms. We should not be satisfied here with a kind of quietism. 29 We need an explanation of why the thought that these norms involve distinctive, noninstrumental nor- (2008): 366-402. Raz writes that "there is no distinctive form of rationality or of normativity that merits the name instrumental rationality or normativity" (24) . Kolodny aims to extend Raz's view and rejects the "myth [that there is] a set of principles that enjoin formal coherence as such" (390). (As Kolodny notes-n. 12-an early version of a related idea occurs in Hugh McCann, "Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints," American Philosophical Quarterly 28 [1991] : 25-36.) And Kolodny notes the relevance of Smart-type worries about "traditional forms of rule utilitarianism" in "Why Be Rational?" 543-44. There may be subtle differences between what is being claimed by these two philosophers, but I take it that in both cases the underlying ideas lead to rejecting the claim that, quite generally, intention coherence and consistency has its own distinctive, noninstrumental normative significance in the particular case.
28. Questions from Nadeem Hussain, Jeffrey Seidman, and Yonatan Shemmer over the years have helped me focus on these issues. And specific questions from Aaron James, in response to a presentation of "Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical," convinced me of the need for a further step. My thanks to all. Aspects of Hussain's challenge are in "The Requirements of Rationality," ver. 
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mative demands on the particular occasion is not, as Kolodny has put it, an "outlandish" concern with "psychic tidiness."
30
Let's focus on Means-End Coherence. To get the kind of account for which we are looking, we will want to say that there is in the particular case a practical reason to avoid means-end incoherence. We will also want to say that this reason to avoid incoherence within a cluster of intentions is not merely a matter of promoting the specific reasons one has for each of the specific intentions in that cluster, taken individually. The reason in question is a distinctive reason against such incoherence itself. And we will want to say that this is a noninstrumental reason against such incoherence itself.
The idea is not to see the role of means-end coherence in practical reasoning as primarily that of one more consideration to be weighed in favor of a specific action. According to the planning theory, the primary role in practical reasoning of our acceptance of a norm of intention coherence is, rather, to help structure deliberation by posing problems of means and the like. The current idea is that we have a distinctive, noninstrumental reason that supports this structuring role in the particular case by supporting the avoidance of the violation of this norm of coherence. When one intends the end but, so far, not the believed necessary means, this distinctive reason to avoid violating the norm of means-end coherence can help pose a problem about how to avoid this incoherence. This reason could thereby support certain transitions in thought over time that help solve this problem-although this reason to avoid incoherence does not by itself determine how exactly to do that. 31 Now, it is too strong to say that there is always an overriding reason to avoid such incoherence. What is more plausible is rather something roughly along the following lines-where I label this proposal 'initial' to signal that we will arrive, in the end, at a more complex view:
Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial: There is a distinctive, noninstrumental practical reason (although one that may be outweighed) to avoid the following: intending E, believing that a 31. So in the terms of Niko Kolodny's discussions of these matters, we are seeing Means-End Coherence as concerned with "the state [the agent] is in at a given time" but supposing that the cited reason can justify certain "transitions from one state to another over time." This is, however, not to say with Kolodny that the basic rationality constraint is itself a "process requirement" ("Why Be Rational?" 517).
necessary means to E is M and that M requires that one now intend M, and yet not now intending M. This is to see the demand of practical rationality in Means-End Coherence as linked to a distinctive, noninstrumental practical reason to avoid a correspondingly incoherent psychological complex. 32 And we can add this link to the ideas, already noted, that guidance by Means-End Coherence both is normally useful in the particular case and is central to a mode of thinking that quite generally enriches our lives. This would give us a three-track account of the normative significance of this norm of practical rationality.
However, even before we argue for something like Reason for MeansEnd Coherence-Initial, we can see a tension with Intentions # Reasons. 
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John Broome calls such an inference a "factual detachment of a reason." 34 And Broome argues that this is not a deductively valid inference. I agree. Even given i and ii, one will normally still have available, without intending M, a way of avoiding what i says one has reason to avoid, namely, by no longer intending E (thereby newly falsifying ii). After all, even if ii is in fact true, one normally retains the ability to make ii false. The claim in iii that there is a practical reason in favor of intending M involves an implicit comparison of intending M with its available alternatives. And premise ii still allows that one of the available alternatives involves giving up the intention in favor of E. Granted, it is true that, in the current circumstances, intending M is sufficient for avoiding what i says there is a reason to avoid. However, intending M is not (in the relevant sense) necessary for this, for one still has it in one's power instead to stop intending E, and it seems consistent with i and ii that that (i.e., no longer intending E) is what there is reason to do.
The purported conflict between Reason for Means-End CoherenceInitial and Intentions # Reasons depends, however, on seeing the inference from i and ii to iii as deductively valid. So perhaps we can retain Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial and still hold on to Intentions # Reasons. We just need to follow Broome in rejecting factual detachment of a reason.
V. NONMODIFIABLE INTENTIONS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF REASONS
Matters are, however, more complicated. Kieran Setiya, to some extent following Patricia Greenspan, has pointed to special cases in which a closely related inference seems acceptable. These are, roughly, cases in which the agent does not have the psychological capacity to change the relevant end intention. 35 And the worry is that, if these inferences are indeed acceptable, then we will still be faced with a deep tension between Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial and Intentions # Reasons. Setiya's explicit concern is with an inference that involves an all-in practical 'should', whereas my focus is on an inference that concerns practical reasons. (See his principle Transmission below.) I am assuming, however, that Setiya would make analogous claims about practical reasons. After all, part of Setiya's case for his cognitivism about instrumental rationality (to be discussed below) is that if we were instead to give these rationality norms distinctive practical normative force, we would be led, by detachment, to unacceptable conclusions. For this line of argument to address the alternative to cognitivism (and to the myth theory) that I am sketching in this essay, it would need to make a claim about the detachment of practical reasons. Setiya's example is an intention to smoke that you do not have the ability to change. What Setiya says is that "there is no decision that would affect [your] intention to smoke." 36 But the example suggests further-although here I go beyond what Setiya says-that this is because your intention is grounded in something like a kind of psychological compulsion, one that is not just a momentary affliction. It is because of this underlying psychological incapacity that your intention is not modifiable by you in the ways in which we normally are able to modify our intentions.
When an intention is not modifiable by the agent because of some such underlying psychological incapacity, I will say that the intention is psychologically nonmodifiable. 37 And such cases of psychologically nonmodifiable intentions reintroduce the tension between Reason for MeansEnd Coherence-Initial and Intentions # Reasons. I proceed to explain why.
Return to Setiya's smoker. And suppose that her relevant beliefs about means are not changeable by her, given her obvious and abundant evidence for them. So, holding these beliefs fixed (as I will throughout this discussion) and given that her intention is psychologically nonmodifiable, the only way that is psychologically available to her to conform to Means-End Coherence is to intend M. Does it follow, given Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial, that she has a reason to intend M?
Well, holding the cited beliefs fixed, the inference now has the form i) There is practical reason to avoid [Intend E but Not Intend M] ii*) Intend E, and this is psychologically nonmodifiable So, iii) There is practical reason in favor of intending M.
And the Setiya detachment claim is that this is a valid inference.
38
Should we agree? Well, support for this detachment claim needs to come from a principle about the transmission of reasons. In his discussion, Setiya appeals to:
36. Setiya, "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," 661. 37. Tamar Schapiro (in conversation) has wondered whether this idea of a nonmodifiable intention is confused, given the tight connection between intention and choice between alternatives. But the agent's proattitude toward smoking may play major roles in organizing thought and action that are characteristic of intention. So I would not want a broad view about the relation between practical rationality and practical reasons to depend on insisting that, nevertheless, this attitude is not an intention.
38. Setiya indicates ("Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," 656 n. 17) that he sees this claim as in the spirit of work of Greenspan, who appeals to what is "unalterable by the agent" (Greenspan, "Conditional Oughts," 265). A similar claim is also made by Mark Schroeder, who also refers to Greenspan. See his "Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons," Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 223-48. There are complex questions here about whether there are different notions of 'unalterable' at work in these claims of these different philosophers. But I put these questions aside here.
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Transmission: If you should do E, all things considered, and doing M is a necessary means to doing E, you should do M, all things considered, too.
39
However, given the way our problem has been set up, what we need is, rather, a principle about the transmission of reasons. 40 It will also facilitate discussion to change the variables. So consider the analogue:
Transmission Reasons-Initial: If R is a practical reason in favor of X, and Y is a necessary means to X, then R is a practical reason in favor of Y.
What we want to know is whether this, or some close variant, supports the Setiya detachment claim for the case in which X is avoid [Intend E but Not Intend M], Y is intend M, and the relevant necessity is provided by the psychological nonmodifiability of intending E. Begin with two preliminary observations. First, I take it that talk of "necessary means" to X should include talk of necessary constitutive elements of X. So I will make this explicit. Second, it seems that what matters are necessary means to, or constitutive elements of, an end that is itself attainable by the agent. A reason for an end that is not itself attainable by the agent may not transmit to a reason for a necessary (but insufficient) means or constitutive element. 41 
So let's consider:
Transmission Reasons: If R is a practical reason in favor of X, X is attainable by the agent, and M is a necessary means to or necessary constitutive element of X, then R is a practical reason in favor of M.
Note that this is a principle about the transmission of reasons antecedently present; this contrasts with Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial which cites a reason to avoid a certain incoherence (a reason that does not require that there be a reason for intending E). Note also that Transmission Reasons concerns the transmission of reasons across lines of necessity. It does not say that a reason for X transfers to sufficient means to X. It can instead allow that an inference to reasons for sufficient means will be defeasible. This depends on the kind of necessity that is needed. And the idea on the table is that if intending E is psychologically nonmodifiable, then intending M is indeed necessary in the relevant sense for the end for which i says that there is a reason, namely, avoiding [Intend E but Not Intend M]. Should we accept Transmission Reasons when interpreted in this way?
Well, suppose there is an unmovable boulder that prevents me from taking route A to the attainable goal I have reason to achieve. If, because of this boulder, taking route B is necessary for that goal, then a reason to achieve that goal transmits to a reason to take route B. And what is plausible, I think, is that the psychological nonmodifiability of intending E makes it appropriate to see that intention as an internal, nonmodifiable analogue of such an unmovable boulder, one that stands in the way of achieving means-end coherence by dropping that intention. So it is plausible that given this psychological nonmodifiability of intending E, a reason for avoiding [Intend E and Not Intend M] transmits to a reason for intending M. 43 Accordingly, I would like to develop my alternative to a myth theory in a way that is consistent with the Setiya detachment claim. 44 43. I do not thereby endorse an analogous claim about detachment in the realm of rationality. Suppose that an agent intends E and has the cited means-end beliefs. And suppose this end intention is psychologically nonmodifiable. Holding fixed the cited beliefs, we can ask whether the following is valid:
A. Intending E while not intending M is pro tanto irrational. B. Intend E, and this is psychologically nonmodifiable So, C. It is pro tanto irrational not to intend M.
And the answer seems to be no. Rationality and irrationality are primarily matters of coherence and consistency within clusters of attitudes (or their absence). Norms like Means-End Coherence say that certain clusters are pro tanto irrational. If we were to go on to say that a single attitude, or even (as in C) the absence of a single attitude, is itself irrational, we would need to locate an incoherence within that very attitude or absence of attitude. But A and B together do not entail that this will be true about the absence of intending M, taken by itself.
If we are going to say that a certain attitude is itself, strictly speaking, irrational (and not mean only that it is part of a complex that is irrational), we need to locate some incoherence or inconsistency within that very attitude. In contrast, a reason for X is a consideration that bears directly on X but need not depend solely on the intrinsic features of X. A reason for X can depend on the fact that Y-where this is a fact about the relation of X to other things or the context within which X would obtain-without being merely a reason for the complex (X and Y). So we need to understand what to say about the transmission of a reason for Z to a reason for that which is in some sense necessary for Z, without assuming that our answer commits us to a corresponding view about detachment of rationality. (This footnote responds to extremely helpful correspondence from John Broome.) 44. And, as I will explain, I would like to develop in this way my alternative to cognitivist theories like Setiya's.
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Now 45 In either case, if we were right before to say that the intention to commit ethnic cleansing, or an akratic intention, does not, in the absence of special circumstances, provide a reason for the means, then won't we also want to say that, in the absence of special considerations, a psychologically nonmodifiable intention in such cases also provides no such reason? But it is not clear how we can say this if we accept both the Setiya detachment claim and Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial.
VI. COGNITIVISM ABOUT INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
The myth theory-in rejecting the distinctive, noninstrumental practical normative force of Means-End Coherence and thereby problematic versions of premise i-is one response to this conundrum. A second response, in contrast, accepts that Means-End Coherence does have a distinctive normative force but offers a different account of this normative force. It sees Means-End Coherence as at bottom a norm of theoretical rationality engaged by the beliefs that are involved in intending. This is Setiya's view and the view of some others as well. 46 And this is the view I have called cognitivism about these norms on intention. For this to work, we would need a close connection between intending and believing. One idea would be that intending E is itself a special kind of belief that E. 48 An alternative idea would be only that intending E necessarily involves a belief that E. 49 With some such link between intending and believing in place, the idea is that when you intend E, have the cited beliefs about the need for M and intending M, but fail to intend M, your associated beliefs include a belief that E without a belief that a believed necessary condition for E will come to pass. And that is a kind of theoretical incoherence.
The central claim is that the rational demand for intention coherence is a demand of theoretical rationality. So even given a psychologically nonmodifiable intention in favor of E, and the cited beliefs, we cannot derive a conclusion that one has a practical reason in favor of M or intending M. But Intentions # Reasons concerns the relation between intending E and practical reasons for intending M. So Intentions # Reasons and our grounds for Intentions # Reasons remain compatible with Theoretical Coherence.
50
48. This is Setiya's view, according to which, roughly, intending E is a desire-like belief that E-because-of-this-very-belief.
49. See, e.g., Wayne Davis, "A Causal Theory of Intending," American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 43-54. In his "Normativity, Commitment and Instrumental Reason," Wallace develops a version of cognitivism that uses a yet weaker belief condition, but I think that it is subject to the same worry I note in the text. (I also think it has a distinctive difficulty with Intention Consistency.) I discuss Wallace's essay in "Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical." 50. As Yonatan Shemmer has emphasized, we can still ask at this point whether (a) it follows from Setiya's view that a person with such an unchangeable intention and the cited beliefs has a theoretical reason to believe he will perform the means. If so, we can go on to ask whether (b) he thereby has a reason to intend the means since that is the only way he is going to believe, with justification, that he will perform the means. Setiya's response to b is that intending M, although it is, on his view, a kind of belief, "also consists in a motivational condition that theoretical reason cannot govern. So it won't make sense to claim that I should intend to do M, in the epistemic sense of 'should'" ("Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," 672 n. 54). The idea, I take it, is that the theoretical or epistemic "should"-and, so, theoretical reasons-cannot coherently apply to the motivational aspect of intending and so cannot coherently apply to intending. But now my worry is that this is, in effect, close to the feature of cognitivism that I go on to criticize in the main text, namely, that the demands of theoretical rationality do not strictly speaking engage intentions-they only engage associated beliefs-and so that we have not captured the full force of Means-End Coherence.
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As I see it, however, such cognitivism about Means-End Coherence runs into significant difficulties, even if we grant the cognitivist the cited close (and controversial) connection between intention and belief. 51 The basic problem arises from the possibility of falsely believing one intends the means.
52
Suppose I intend E and know that E requires both M and that I now intend M. If I still do not intend M, my intentions suffer from means-end incoherence. But suppose that, while I in fact do not now intend M, I nevertheless falsely believe that I now intend M. My beliefs are that E, that E requires both M and that I now intend M, that I now intend M, and that M. There is no incoherence (although there is falsity) in this structure of beliefs. So means-end incoherence does not entail belief incoherence, contrary to Theoretical Coherence.
I have tried to assess some replies to this objection in other work.
53
Here let me just say that in my judgment this effort to understand the normativity of Means-End Coherence as a matter of theoretical rationality is unlikely to work. So I seek a path between a myth theory and cognitivism. The idea is to strengthen ii by adding a nonmodifiability condition:
VII. SIMULTANEOUS SOLUTIONS
ii*) Intend E, and this is psychologically nonmodifiable.
The thought is that we thereby get (by way of an appropriate transmission-of-reasons principle) a valid inference from i and ii* to iii:
iii) There is practical reason in favor of intending M.
And the claim that we can reach this conclusion quite generally is in tension with our grounds for Intentions # Reasons.
But consider now the reason cited in i. Suppose that this reason depends on the presence of certain normal background conditions; i should then be replaced by i*) Given normal conditions C, there is practical reason to avoid
[Intend E but Not Intend M].
We could then ask whether the further condition of nonmodifiability in ii* (a condition needed to support the detachment inference) precludes condition C in i* (a condition needed to support the relevant reason) and thereby blocks the relevant reason. If the answer is yes, then the relevant inferences would not be sound. What account of the reason in i* involves a background condition that is, at least normally, incompatible with the nonmodifiability condition in ii*? It is here that I want to return to the idea, anticipated at the beginning of this essay, that what is central is our reason to govern our own lives: the relevant reason for intention coherence and consistency derives from a reason for self-governance. 54 However, at least normally, this reason only favors a structure of intentions that are appropriately modifiable since the capacity to be self-governing in a relevant domain normally involves an appropriate capacity to modify relevant intentions. And that capacity to modify is blocked by the nonmodifiability invoked in ii*. I proceed to develop and to defend this proposal.
54. This thought is to some extent similar in spirit to David Copp's defense of the claim that "rationality is in the service of self-government" ("The Normativity of SelfGrounded Reason," in his Morality in a Natural World [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 309-53, 351). It may also be to some extent similar in spirit to efforts to ground these rationality norms in forms of integrity or the like. For example, Kenneth Stalzer explores the idea that we might ground such rationality norms in what he calls "self-fidelity" ("On the Normativity of the Instrumental Principle" [PhD diss., Stanford University, 2004], chap. 5). And Jonathan Dancy briefly considers an appeal to "integrity" and "self-respect" as a ground for a related wide-scope "ought" ("Replies," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 [2003] : 468-90, 474-75). However, the appeal specifically to self-governance has a feature that will be important below, namely, the distinctive connection between self-governance and modifiability of attitude in the light of reasons and rationality.
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VIII. SELF-GOVERNANCE AND PLANNING AGENCY
Return to the thought that our planning agency helps to constitute and to support our cross-temporal self-governance. In the background is Harry Frankfurt's insight that we need an account of what it is for an agent to identify with a certain thought or attitude-of what it is for a thought or attitude to speak for the agent, to be part of where the agent stands, to have agential authority. 55 We need this because cross-temporal self-governance consists, in part, in guidance by psychological structures that have agential authority. The problem of agential authority is, roughly, the problem of specifying psychological structures that are such that when they guide, the agent governs. 56 Now, elsewhere I have argued that for an attitude to have agential authority for agents like us is in significant part for it to play central roles in the Lockean cross-temporal organization and integration of thought and action. 57 And I have argued, further, that certain plan-type attitudes-in particular, policies concerning what to treat as justifying in practical reasoning-are central cases of attitudes with such authority. These authoritative policies of reasoning need to be embedded in structures of planning agency. So structures of planning agency are an essential element in this solution to the problem of agential authority.
I do not say that such planning structures are the unique solution to the problem of agential authority. But they are one solution, and a solution that seems characteristic of us. And this role in our self-governance is part of a rationale for these planning structures-structures that involve guidance by norms of consistency and coherence of intention.
However, this does not yet explain why norms of intention consistency and coherence have their own distinctive normative force on the particular occasion. So far we have only concerned ourselves with the general significance of planning structures in our lives. Can we provide 56. More precisely, when psychological structures have agential authority, then when they guide, the agent directs, and the agent's direction of action is an essential feature of the agent's governance of action.
57. See, e.g., my "Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency" and "Three Theories of Self-Governance," in my Structures of Agency, 21-46 and 222-53. (My talk here of "integration" draws from Luca Ferrero, "What Good Is a Diachronic Will?" Philosophical Studies, forthcoming, sec. 7, DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9217-1.) Drawing on an idea from Frankfurt, I also cite in these essays a condition of "satisfaction" that needs to be fulfilled if an attitude is to have agential authority.
an explanation of such distinctive normative force by developing further these ideas about self-governance? I think we can.
Return to a Frankfurtian concern with where I stand. When I recognize inconsistency in my own intentions, I see that in this specific case there is no clear answer to the question, "Where do I stand?" This question about myself is, with respect to this domain, simply not settled; there is as yet no fact of the matter. 58 We can say something similar about means-end incoherent plans. If I intend end E but I do not now intend known necessary means intending which now I know to be necessary, there is no clear answer to the question, "Where do I stand?" with respect to E. With respect to this end, there is as yet no relevant fact of the matter about where I stand.
The idea, then, is that inconsistency or incoherence of plan has an implication concerning the metaphysics of agency, namely, that in this particular case there is as yet no determinate answer to a relevant question about where the agent stands. This is because a central way that planning agents like us take such a stand-given the fundamental roles of planning structures in our practical thought and action-is to go beyond a conflicting stew of needs, desires, and considerations and settle on consistent and coherent plans and the like.
Granted, one can have incompatible desires, or desires for ends without desires for known necessary means, and yet there still be a clear answer to the question of where one stands on a relevant issue. Such conflict within, or incompleteness of, one's desires is a common feature of the human condition. But inconsistent or incoherent plans-where, as I am understanding them, plans are intentions writ large-do seem to baffle the kind of unity of stance needed for there to be a clear answer to that question.
The next point is that it is only if there is a place where you stand that you are governing in the corresponding domain, for in self-governance where you stand guides relevant thought and action. And this, together with the role of intention consistency and coherence in there being a place where you stand, implies that, in any particular case, relevant consistency and coherence of intention is a necessary constitutive element in the corresponding self-governance of planning agents like us. The necessity here is a kind of metaphysical necessity, relative to a type of agent: for planning agents like us, relevant consistency and coherence of intention is a necessary element in the metaphysics of 58. I say "with respect to this domain" to indicate that I am not claiming that any inconsistency or incoherence blocks taking a stand on all matters. The claim I want to make is relativized to matters that are in the content of the intentions that are inconsistent or incoherent.
corresponding self-governance. And this suggests that we understand the distinctive reason for conforming to Means-End Coherence in the particular case as tied to our self-governance.
We suppose, that is, that we have an intrinsic reason to govern our own lives. We note that relevant conformity to Means-End Coherence (as well as Intention Consistency) is a necessary constitutive element in the corresponding self-governance of planning agents like us. On the assumption that such self-governance is available to the agent, we infer, by way of Transmission Reasons, that there is a reason of self-governance to avoid violating these norms of practical rationality. We note that this reason of self-governance for avoiding such irrationality is distinctive: it is not merely derived from the specific reasons one has for each of the specific intentions in the relevant cluster, taken individually. And we note that this is a noninstrumental reason for avoiding such irrationality since it derives from the fact that such avoidance is a necessary constitutive element in (rather than an instrumental means to) relevant selfgovernance. And that is why, in seeing Means-End Coherence as having distinctive, noninstrumental normative force in a particular case, we are not-to return to Kolodny's worry-guilty of an outlandish concern with psychic tidiness. 59 That, anyway, is the basic idea. To this let me add three further comments. First, I want to allow that the cited reason in favor of selfgovernance may itself be an internal reason that is grounded in our normal concern with governing our own lives-although I do not say that every agent must care about self-governance. 60 To keep the discussion manageable, then, I will assume that if the reason of self-governance 59 . Kolodny notes that my approach to self-governance (he calls it autonomy) "suggests that the value of autonomy itself might provide reason . . . to satisfy C [the constraint of intention consistency], at least where self-governing policies are concerned." Kolodny's main reply is that this "explains the normativity of C only insofar as C applies to selfgoverning policies, or to intentions that affect self-governing policies. But C applies to other intentions" ("Myth of Practical Consistency," 385). My claim in the text, however, is that my approach to "the normativity of C" by way of appeal to self-governance applies quite generally to the intentions of an agent for whom relevant self-governance is psychologically possible.
Kolodny also makes the point that "making self-governing policies consistent as such does not facilitate autonomy. If one achieves consistency by dropping both self-governing policies, one is no closer to autonomy" (ibid., 385). I agree, of course, that the mere absence of inconsistency and incoherence is not sufficient for there to be a relevant place where you stand. But my argument only requires that relevant consistency and coherence are necessary constitutive elements of taking a relevant stand.
60. I think, by the way, that it would be a plausible result that an agent who did not care about his own self-governance would not have a distinctive, noninstrumental reason in the particular case in favor of intention consistency and coherence-although consistency-and-coherence-constrained planning would still be for such an agent a universal means and an element in important forms of sociality.
is grounded in this concern with self-governance, then the agents we are discussing do indeed have that concern.
Second, I assume that the kind of self-governance that is favored by the cited reason is a garden-variety self-governance that can be embedded in a natural causal order. Planning structures support this kind of self-governance, not by pulling the agent out of the causal order but by supporting relevant forms of psychological guidance and control. Such self-governance can, however, be blocked by various kinds of psychological incapacities.
Third, in appealing to Transmission Reasons to support the transfer of the reason for self-governance to a reason for a necessary constitutive element of self-governance we need to suppose that relevant self-governance is indeed psychologically possible.
I propose then that, for planning agents like us, if relevant selfgovernance is psychologically possible, then the reason for self-governance provides a distinctive, noninstrumental reason for conformity to Means-End Coherence in the particular case since such conformity is a necessary constitutive element of relevant self-governance. This reason will support the way in which the acceptance of Means-End Coherence helps pose problems for further deliberation, problems about how to fill in or modify one's plans so as not to violate MeansEnd Coherence.
We have arrived, then, at an adjusted version of our earlier Reason for Means-End Coherence-Initial:
Reason for Means-End Coherence: When relevant self-governance is psychologically possible, there is a distinctive, noninstrumental practical reason (although one that may be outweighed)-a reason of self-governance-to avoid the following: intending E, believing that a necessary means to E is M and that M requires that one now intend M, and yet not now intending M. reason. 62 So long as the agent is capable of relevant self-governance, there is a reason of self-governance for conformity to Means-End Coherence. 63 We can now return to Setiya's objection.
IX. REPLY TO SETIYA: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND INTENTION MODIFIABILITY
Recall that the Setiya detachment claim focuses on a purported inference of the following form (where I continue to hold fixed the cited means-end beliefs):
i) There is practical reason to avoid [Intend E but Not Intend M] i*) Intend E, and this is psychologically nonmodifiable So, iii) There is practical reason in favor of intending M.
In the current case the relevant, purported inference is, roughly,
Given that relevant self-governance is psychologically possible, there is a practical reason of self-governance to avoid [Intend E but Not Intend M] P intends E (and has the cited beliefs), and the intention in favor of E is psychologically nonmodifiable So, There is practical reason in favor of P intending the necessary means, M.
Setiya's idea, as I have understood it, is that, although Broome is right to reject simple factual detachment of a reason, the psychological nonmodifiability of the intention in favor of the end does make the detachment work. However, if the nonmodifiability of intention cited in the second premise blocks the psychological possibility of relevant selfgovernance, then this inference will misfire: the second premise will block a background condition for the reason cited in the first premise. And indeed, it does seem that if one has an intention that is not 62. Although if the intentions concern mundane matters, the strength of the distinctive reason would be correspondingly weak.
63. Might the myth theorist accept this link but claim that the need for the background condition shows that there still is no reason for means-end coherence "as such" (to use Kolodny's formulation)? The purported myth would then be the idea that this distinctive reason for coherence applies without any assumptions at all about the underlying capacities of the agent. But then the supposed myth would turn out to be an overly simplified view of the relation between certain practical reasons and the underlying capacities of the agent. And it seems that the myth theorists see themselves as challenging considerably more than some such oversimplification. In particular, I take it that they would want to challenge the idea that there is, in general, a distinctive reason for meansend coherence when the agent is capable of relevant self-governance. susceptible to modification in the light of reflection on reasons and rationality, then that would normally entail that in this specific domain one is not capable of being self-governing. To be self-governing is not only to have a relevant stand but, normally at least, for one's stand to be psychologically modifiable in the light of relevant reflection. 64 But it is the absence of such psychological modifiability that is crucial to Setiya's strategy for detaching a reason for means. So Setiya's inference in such cases will normally fail.
So once we turn to Reason for Means-End Coherence, we can block the objection that appeals to cases of psychological nonmodifiability like that of Setiya's smoker. The nonmodifiability that is appealed to in order to support the detachment of a reason for intending means from a reason for means-end coherence also blocks the attainability of selfgovernance that is part of the ground for that reason for coherence. We can thereby chart a course, in our understanding of Means-End Coherence, between a myth theory and cognitivism, and we can do this in a way that coheres with the grounds that led us to Intentions # Reasons.
And that is what we wanted.
X. TAKING STOCK
Recall the two cases that led us to Intentions # Reasons: the case of a weak-willed intention and the case of intending a bad end. Now, according to Reason for Means-End Coherence there is a distinctive, noninstrumental reason for intention coherence in the particular case so long as the planning agent is psychologically capable of relevant self-governance. And this is a distinctive practical reason. So in standard versions of these two cases there will be a distinctive practical reason for coherence of intentions. But Broome's objection to factual detachment of a 64. Granted, if one recognizes that certain of one's intentions-as in Setiya's example, the intention to smoke-are not psychologically modifiable, one might still be able to step back and figure out a strategy for responding to this feature of one's own psychology. One might, say, lock up the cigarette cabinet. And in figuring out and executing this strategy one may be self-governing. So nonmodifiability of an intention does not block all self-governance in the neighborhood. (A point emphasized in conversation by Gideon Yaffe and Larry Temkin.) And Reason for Means-End Coherence, taken together with the idea that self-governance normally requires relevant modifiability, seems to get the right result for such a case: one does not have a reason of self-governance to ensure that one's intention to smoke is supplemented with intentions about means to that, although one does have a reason of self-governance to ensure that one's intention to lock up the cigarette cabinet is supplemented with relevant intentions about means.
What about intention consistency? Well, in such a case one might intend to smoke, intend to lock the cabinet, and know that if one locks the cabinet one cannot smoke. So one violates Intention Consistency. But since the intention to smoke is not relevantly modifiable, one does not have a reason of self-governance to avoid this violation.
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Suppose, however, that these end intentions are psychologically nonmodifiable. Well, such nonmodifiability of intention is normally incompatible with the ability to govern one's life in the relevant subdomain. So there is no distinctive reason of self-governance in favor of relevant intention coherence in these cases-although we can still see a general disposition to seek intention coherence as useful. Since there is no such distinctive reason for relevant intention coherence in the particular case, there is no danger of arriving, by way of detachment from such a reason, at a reason specifically for the means.
Consider then the reflective thought of a planning agent with modifiable attitudes. Such an agent will be guided by her acceptance of practical rationality norms of consistency and means-end coherence of intention. She will be in a position to see such guidance as likely useful in the current case and as, in general, enriching our lives. Further, she will also be in a position to see the direct application of these norms to the particular case as having distinctive, noninstrumental normative force that is backed by a reason in favor of her self-governance. So she is in a position in these three ways to make justificatory sense of this central element of her practical thinking. Her guidance of her thought and action by these norms of practical rationality is, first, likely useful in the current case and is, second, generally supportive of the richness of our lives and the effectiveness of our agency. And, third, conformity to these norms is, in the particular case, a necessary constituent of a form of agency-namely, self-governance-for which she recognizes a reason. It is time, however, to consider some important complexities.
XI. OTHER REASONS FOR MEANS-END COHERENCE?
I have argued that there is a distinctive, noninstrumental practical reason-a reason of self-governance-of the sort cited in Reason for MeansEnd Coherence. Our reason to govern our lives normally transmits to a reason for avoiding relevant means-end incoherence in the particular case since such coherence is a necessary constitutive element of relevant self-governance of planning agents. However, the transmission of this reason for self-governance to a reason in the particular case for meansend coherence normally requires that the relevant intentions be psy-65. Granted, one way in which the agent can achieve relevant coherence is to intend the necessary means. But we have been supposing-with Broome-that practical reasons do not deductively transfer along lines of sufficient but not necessary means. And even though M is a necessary means to E, in the envisaged case intending M is not necessary for that for which Reason for Means-End Coherence says there is a reason, namely, meansend coherence.
chologically modifiable since such modifiability is normally needed for the self-governance to be psychologically available. So the incapacity in the case of Setiya's smoker blocks the transmission of the reason to govern oneself to a reason for means-end coherence.
Once we see that there is this distinctive practical reason for avoiding means-end incoherence, however, we need to consider the possibility that this reason is not unique, that there are other distinctive, noninstrumental practical reasons for avoiding means-end incoherence in addition to the reason that is grounded in the reason for self-governance. And we need to consider the possibility that some such further practical reason for avoiding means-end incoherence would not have the same background condition of intention modifiability. If there were such a further reason for avoiding means-end incoherence, we could not block the Setiya detachment in the way that we blocked it in the case of a reason of self-governance. So we would need yet again to worry about a potential incompatibility with our grounds for Intentions # Reasons.
A natural proposal here is that there is an intrinsic reason simply for the kind of psychic unity that is one aspect of self-governance. 66 For planning agents, means-end coherence of intentions would be an essential element in such psychic unity. So if such psychic unity were psychologically available, a reason for such unity would transmit, in the particular case, to a reason to avoid means-end incoherence. But such unity by itself would not preclude the possibility that certain intentions within that unity are not psychologically modifiable. So this proposed reason for psychic unity would induce a reason for avoiding means-end incoherence even for cases like that of Setiya's smoker. But then, if the Setiya detachment works, we are going to end up with reasons of psychic unity for terrible means to bad ends, when the intention for those ends is psychologically nonmodifiable. What to say?
Well, as they say, one philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens. A theory along the lines I am sketching will, in this case, favor modus tollens. We do not think that, normally, a psychologically nonmodifiable intention in favor of a bad end provides a reason for the terrible means. But we are granting that a version of the Setiya detachment claim has force. So we will want to be skeptical of the conjecture that there is, quite generally, an intrinsic reason for psychic unity independent of the modifiability of the relevant intentions. And, indeed, it does seem plausible that the psychological nonmodifiability of the intention, although it does not block the psychic unity itself, does normally block the reason in favor of such psychic unity.
So even given the Setiya detachment claim, there are two ways in 66. Jeffrey Seidman, in correspondence, has emphasized this possibility.
which the psychological nonmodifiability of the end intention-a nonmodifiability needed to make the detachment work-can nevertheless undermine the soundness of the purported reasoning to a conclusion about a reason for intending the means. (A) The psychological nonmodifiability of the end intention normally ensures that relevant selfgovernance is not attainable. But for the reason for self-governance to transmit to a reason for means-end coherence, in accordance with Transmission Reasons, it is required that the relevant self-governance be attainable. So in this case there is not a reason of self-governance for means-end coherence. (B) While we do not say that psychologically nonmodifiable intentions make relevant psychic unity itself unattainable, we do say that there is not in general a reason for psychic unity that involves such nonmodifiable intentions.
In A we grant the reason for self-governance generally, but we see the psychological nonmodifiability of a relevant intention as normally blocking the attainability of self-governance and thereby blocking transmission of the reason for self-governance to a reason for means-end coherence. In B we see the psychological nonmodifiability of the intention, not as blocking the attainability of psychic unity but rather as normally blocking the reason, in the particular case, for the psychic unity. Now, in taking this position in B we are, in effect, applying Kolodny's skepticism about a reason for psychic tidiness to the idea of a reason for psychic unity quite generally. What Kolodny may miss, however, is the normal relation between psychic unity and governing your life. It is this relation-together with the idea that we do indeed have a reason to govern our own lives-that enables us to avoid a myth theory (as well as cognitivism) while sharing a version of Kolodny's skepticism about a reason for mere psychic tidiness. And once we appeal to this reason for self-governance, we can invoke the normal condition on self-governance that the relevant attitudes be psychologically modifiable and thereby block a reason for means-end coherence in the cases of psychologically nonmodifiable intention highlighted by Setiya.
Or, at least we can do this insofar as self-governance requires psychological modifiability of relevant intentions. We now need to consider a challenge to this.
XII. VOLITIONAL NECESSITY AND REASONS OF SELF-GOVERNANCE
Harry Frankfurt argues that certain special kinds of incapacities to modify basic commitments are not only compatible with self-governance; they are essential to self-governance. 67 Frankfurt calls these "volitional necessities." Such volitional necessities involve an incapacity to change a basic commitment right now and a higher order approval of that incapacity, where that higher-order approval is itself not changeable at will. And in the case of a volitional necessity, the agent is wholehearted about all of this. For example, as Frankfurt sees it human beings almost always have a volitionally necessary commitment to their own physical integrity, and a parent may have a volitionally necessary commitment to promote the interests of his child. Frankfurt sees such cases as paradigms of love: we love our physical integrity, and the parent loves his child. In each case, although the relevant commitments are nonmodifiable, their guidance of the agent's thought and action can constitute self-governance.
If this is right then the idea that psychological nonmodifiability of intention precludes relevant self-governance is in need of qualification. What to say?
Well, I think that in many cases of self-governance the relevant commitments are not, strictly speaking, volitionally necessary. One is not incapable of change. It is just that one is wholehearted about a central commitment and sees no good reason for change. This is rational stability, not incapacity. 68 Nevertheless, it is plausible that some special cases of self-governance do involve intended ends that are volitionally necessary. Perhaps Frankfurt's case of parental love will be such a case. Such volitional necessity requires, recall, not just an incapacity to change the intended end right now but also an approval of that incapacity, an approval that itself is not changeable at will-where one is wholehearted about all of this. So the psychological incapacity involved in volitional necessity is distinctive. As Frankfurt says, "It is important to appreciate the difference between the necessities of love and various other deeply entrenched constraints upon the will, which are due to unwelcome and more or less pathological conditions such as compulsions, obsessions, and addictions." 69 In contrast, Setiya's smoker is faced with one of the latter sorts of "constraints upon the will." Keeping in mind this special nature of volitional necessity, it does seem plausible that in cases of volitional necessity the nonmodifiability of the end intention need not block self-governance. So nonmodifiability of intention, in these special cases, will not block the reason of self-governance cited in Reason for Means-End Coherence. So in these cases of Frankfurtian self-governance by way of volitional necessities, Setiya's detachment can go through, and we can detach a reason for necessary means. 70 Frankfurt says that "love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons." 71 So perhaps he would call the just-noted reasons for means to what is loved "reasons of love." But that is not the idea I am now sketching. To be sure, the agent's love is, in these cases, essential to the reason for means. But the basic ground for the reason I am highlighting is not the love itself but rather the reason for governing our own lives, as that reason applies to Frankfurtian cases of self-governance. The love provides a reason for means, but it is the reason for self-governance that grounds this reason for the means. So rather than call these reasons of love, it is more accurate to call them reasons of Frankfurtian self-governance. 72 70. In Setiya's smoker case, the psychological nonmodifiability of the end intention supports detachment of a reason for means but also blocks the reason of self-governance in the background of the detachment. What we have just noted is that the volitional necessity of the end intention can, in contrast, support the detachment without blocking the self-governance. In this sense, volitional necessities can differentially impact the detachment of a reason for intending means, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the conditions that block the self-governance that grounds the reason for means-end coherence. This raises the question of whether there are other kinds of necessity that can have such a differential impact.
Consider, in particular, two kinds of necessity highlighted by John Fischer in comments on this essay. There is, first, the idea that intending E is causally determined by antecedent conditions. And there is, second, the idea that there is a Frankfurt-style counterfactual intervener hanging around to ensure that the agent not diverge from a path that includes intending E. (See Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," as reprinted in his Importance of What We Care About, 1-10.) Do either of these kinds of necessity have such a differential impact? While a serious discussion of these issues is of course beyond the scope of this essay, it does seem plausible that the necessity involved in causal determination does not have such a differential impact. Such necessity of the end intention seems neither to block the kind of garden-variety self-governance a reason for which is playing a central role in this discussion nor to support the detachment of a reason for intending means. The second case-that of the Frankfurt-style counterfactual interveneris harder, in part because of difficulties in understanding exactly what is involved in such cases. My tentative conjecture would be that here too there is not the kind of differential impact we have discovered in the case of volitional necessity. But this is not an issue I can pursue here. Intentions # Reasons: Intending E does not in general provide a practical, normative reason for necessary means to E and so does not in general provide a practical, normative reason for intending those necessary means.
Will acknowledging such reasons of Frankfurtian self-governance be in tension with the considerations that led us to Intentions # Reasons? Well, we can acknowledge such reasons of Frankfurtian self-governance while still insisting that normally intentions for ends are not volitionally necessary in Frankfurt's sense and so (for Broome-type reasons) do not in general induce (by way of detachment) reasons for means, even given a reason of self-governance for conformity to MeansEnd Coherence in the particular case. Further, if we suppose that the end intention is psychologically nonmodifiable in the way illustrated by Setiya's smoker, we block the background condition for the relevant reason of self-governance in favor of means-end coherence. And finally, in one basic case that led us to Intentions # Reasons-the case of weak-willed intention-the possibility that the weak-willed intention for the end is volitionally necessary is blocked by the wholeheartedness condition on volitional necessity since weakness of will precludes wholeheartedness.
This brings us, however, to the hard case. Suppose someone has a volitionally necessary commitment to a bad end-the personal destruction of a good and successful leader, say. This commitment is not modifiable, the person approves of this, this approval is not modifiable, and the person is wholehearted about all of this. This is not compulsion; it is volitional necessity. Call this person Iago.
Is Iago capable of relevant self-governance? Well, his commitment is volitionally necessary, but we have granted that this special kind of incapacity need not block, and may help constitute, self-governance. But Iago's end is bad. Yes, but I take it that you can be self-governing in the pursuit of bad ends, just as a society can govern itself by way of a legal system that aims at bad things. So if there is in general a reason to govern our own lives, and if the Setiya inference is valid, then in this special kind of case the volitionally necessary bad end does induce a reason of Frankfurtian self-governance for the necessary means.
This reason for the means is not grounded in Iago's love: it is grounded in the reason for self governance, taken together with Iago's volitionally necessary love. When we endorse this reason of self-governance, we do not thereby endorse what Iago loves; what we endorse is, means-end coherence is blocked in the special case of volitionally necessary bad ends. This reason is blocked not because such volitionally necessary bad ends block self-governance; indeed, we are supposing that they need not block self-governance. The idea, rather, is that there is no intrinsic reason for self-governance that involves volitionally necessary bad ends.
The problem is that the idea that agents-at least, those agents who care intrinsically about governing their own lives-have quite generally a reason to govern their own lives, even given volitionally necessary bad ends, seems extremely plausible. So it seems much harder to insist that this reason does not apply when the self-governance involves volitionally necessary bad ends-much harder, that is, than it was to reject an overly general reason for mere psychic unity. Still, I do not see a way to settle this issue within the constraints of the current discussion. So let me just acknowledge that the conclusion that Iago has a reason of self-governance in favor of his terrible means depends on rejecting this, so to speak, modus tollens strategy in the case of the reason for selfgovernance: it depends on rejecting the claim that volitionally necessary bad ends quite generally block the reason for relevant self-governance even though they do not block the self-governance itself. I myself find it more plausible instead to conclude that Iago does indeed have a reason for the means. But at the least we now have a clearer understanding of the philosophical price of resisting that conclusion. 75 75. I myself once tried to resist this conclusion, without paying the price, in "Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability," 83-84.
